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MARITIME UNIONS AND 
THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE
Richard L. Clarke 
Clemson University
U.S. maritime unions have played a vital historical role in both the defense and the economic 
development of the United States. The economic and the political forces that helped shape 
and promote the growth of U.S. seafaring labor unions changed dramatically in the 1990s. 
Maritime union membership in the United States has fallen by more than 80 per cent since 
1950. Inflexible union work rules and high union wage scales have contributed to this decline. 
Recent regulatory and industry changes require a new union approach if U. S. maritime 
unions are to survive the next decade.
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, America’s two largest ocean carriers, 
Sea-Land and American President Line (APL) 
applied to the Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) for permission to change the country 
of registry of several of their largest and newest 
container ships from the United States to 
foreign, so-called flag of convenience countries. 
The CEOs of these two companies joined forces 
to argue that unless the federal government took 
immediate action to create significant new 
operating subsidies, their companies would be 
unable to continue to compete with foreign-flag 
carriers whose crew costs per month are about 
one-third that of U.S. flag carriers.
Organized maritime labor vigorously opposed the 
reflagging proposal because it would have 
eliminated several hundred union jobs. Since 
passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 
ship owners registering their ships in the United 
States have been required to crew their ships 
with U.S. citizens who are union members. U.S.
maritime labor is organized and controlled by 12 
major AFL-CIO chartered unions and 18 
company-sponsored unions. Over the past 60 
years, maritime unions have in large part 
controlled crew size and crew costs on vessels of 
U.S. registry. The gauntlet laid down by APL 
and Sea-Land posed a serious threat to U.S. 
maritime labor unions, whose membership has 
shrunk significantly from post-WWII levels. 
Fortunately for organized labor, the situation 
was resolved in their favor when the Clinton 
Administration persuaded Sea-Land and APL to 
maintain U.S. registry for the ships at issue by 
offering a new operating subsidy bill.
In 1996, after years of intensive lobbying by 
several different maritime interest groups, 
Congress passed the Maritime Security Act of 
1996. Under this plan, Sea-Land and APL as 
well as smaller operators of U.S.-registered deep- 
sea vessels (U.S. flagships) will receive 
significant subsidy payments for designated 
ships. In exchange, the carriers must pledge to 
provide the subsidized ships to the Department
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of Defense upon request to support emergency 
military sealift needs. The primary beneficiaries 
of this law, Sea-Land and APL, subsequently 
dropped their request to change the country of 
registry for their ships to foreign countries where 
ship operating costs are much lower (called 
reflagging or flagging out). Sea-land and APLs’ 
response to the passage of this new maritime 
subsidy program preserves what remains of the 
U.S. flag deep-sea fleet. The real underlying 
issue that motivated their request for reflagging 
was not addressed. The real issue is the 
continuing high cost of unionized U.S. maritime 
labor relative to the rest of the global shipping 
industry.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the 
impact maritime unions have had on the growth 
and development of the U.S. Merchant Marine 
through their strikes, lobbying efforts and more 
recent cooperation with carrier management. 
The development and influence of maritime 
unions is traced from the Maritime Security Act 
of 1915 to the present. The paper briefly reviews 
the history of maritime unions then examines 
the impact maritime unions have had on the 
formation of national policy regarding the U.S. 
Merchant Marine. The paper concludes by 
considering the implications of the Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA) and recent 
ocean carrier mergers.
HISTORY OF U.S. MARITIME UNIONS
To understand the impact that maritime unions 
have had on the U.S. flag shipping industry, it is 
necessary to understand the pervasive nature of 
U.S. maritime unions in the industry. U.S. 
maritime unions include both licensed and 
unlicensed seamen on U.S. flag oceangoing 
vessels, Great Lakes ships and inland waterway 
tugs and barges. There are two longshoremen’s 
unions, five unions for shipyard workers, twelve 
primary seagoing unions and nineteen 
independent labor unions who do business with 
individual oil companies (Heine, 1976). Over the 
years these unions became very powerful 
because they have had the legal right to
determine crew size and composition for 
different classes of ships. More importantly, 
U.S. maritime unions are empowered to assign 
only union members to crew U.S. flag vessels, 
determine what they will be paid and how long 
they may be at sea. These powers have enabled 
the unions to control the variable cost of 
oceangoing labor for U.S. flag shipping.
The Strengthening of Maritime Unions
The genesis of U.S. maritime unions can be 
traced back to the Seamen’s Act of 1915. This 
act established the legal right of maritime 
workers to form unions and create standard 
work rules for all their members. This act also 
ended imprisonment for deserting one’s ship and 
established standards for food and quarters 
aboard U.S.-flag ships. There is little doubt the 
Seamen’s Act of 1915 was vitally needed to 
protect crew members from human rights abuses 
by powerful shipping companies and 
shipmasters.
The rights of maritime workers were further 
strengthened by the Merchant Marine Act of 
1936. This law, best known for its creation of 
operating (ODS) and construction differential 
(CDS) subsidies, improved living and working 
conditions for maritime labor. It also empowered 
labor unions to select only select union members 
for crew duty. A year later in 1937, a federal 
commission completed a comprehensive review 
of the operation practices of U.S.-flag carriers 
and maritime labor union management.
This commission found several problems. The 
main problems identified by the commission 
included interunion friction, union-shipper 
conflict, crew inefficiencies and a general lack of 
discipline and order aboard ship (Quartel, 1992). 
The commission attempted to solve these 
problems through a program that included 
subsidies to improve onboard living conditions, a 
minimum wage for each rating and manning 
scales. Federal guidelines were also enacted to 
cover overtime pay, maximum time at sea and 
vacation time for union members.
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During the 1930s, maritime unions played a 
significant role in improving safety, living 
conditions, training, pay and compensation of 
labor and made the U.S. maritime industry a 
much more desirable place to work. As a result, 
there was constant supply of skilled seamen 
available to operate an increasing number of 
U.S. flag vessels and make the U.S. Merchant 
Marine a powerful force as the United States 
prepared to enter World War II. Following the 
conclusion of World War II, the U.S. Merchant 
Marine began a long and steady decline in its 
size and strength. As shown from U.S. Maritime 
Administration data in Table 1, the number of 
U.S. seamen sailing aboard U.S. deep-sea vessels 
declined more than 80 per cent from 1950 to 
1999 (Marad, 1999). This steep decline closely 
paralleled the decline in the size of the U. S. 
Deep Sea Fleet from 1100 vessels in 1950 to 283 




Source: Maritime Administration, Office of Maritime 
Labor, Training, and Safety
This decline can be attributed to several external 
factors including (1) intense competition from 
state-owned and state subsidized foreign 
carriers, (2) lack of consistent U.S. maritime 
promotion policy, (3) growth of container
shipping and container handling technology and 
(4) large seasonal and annual swings in the 
demand for ocean transportation. These and 
other factors have led U.S shipowners to reflag 
more and more of their ships to reduce operating 
cost and be more competitive with low cost 
shipping offered by foreign lines. These factors 
have combined to put increasing pressure on the 
already strained relationship between organized 
maritime labor and U.S. carriers. The unions 
have consistently strived to raise labor rates and 
maintain crew sizes while the owners have 
continued to eliminate high-cost union jobs by 
registering more vessels in foreign countries like 
Panama, Liberia, Honduras, and more recently 
the Marshall Islands. In 1970, the Nixon 
Administration tried to resolve some of these 
nagging union-management disputes and 
revitalize the U.S maritime industry.
Cooperation for Revitalization
The serious deterioration of the United States 
Merchant Marine between 1946 and 1969 caused 
in part by union-management disputes led to the 
passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. 
The goal of this act was to revitalize the U.S. 
merchant marine by promoting the construction 
and use of American flag ships.
To accomplish this goal, the Act attempted to 
control the high cost of operating U.S. flag ships. 
Sea-going wages were indexed and crew size was 
to be decided in the ship design phase rather 
than negotiated by maritime unions. The act 
envisioned 300 new U.S. flag ships would be 
built in U.S. shipyards by 1980. Unfortunately, 
only 63 new U.S. merchant cargo ships were 
built and the Act fell far short of revitalizing the 
deteriorating U.S. maritime industry (Whitehurst, 
1983).
In 1972, several maritime unions agreed to new 
rules aimed at increasing cooperation with U.S. 
ship owners. Six seagoing and shoreside unions 
agreed to rules aimed at increasing maritime 
labor stability and improving the image of the 
merchant marine. Irwin Heine (1976) lists the 
five major provisions of the agreement:
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• No strike during the period of contract 
negotiations.
• Three to five year contracts to provide 
assurance with respect to continuity of 
operations.
• Uniform contract expiration dates.
• Provision for automatic wage adjustments 
annually.
• Establishment of mechanism or procedure for 
the resolution of disputes without stoppages.
These new cooperative policies were formulated 
by maritime union leadership to foster a spirit of 
cooperation with carrier management; however, 
the critical issues of crew sizes and ocean going 
pay rates were not addressed.
MARITIME UNIONS AND 
MERCHANT MARINE POLICY
Maritime unions have been consistent in their 
position on merchant marine policy. Their main 
goal has always been to protect the American 
maritime labor from foreign competition by 
supporting policies and programs that promote 
the competitiveness of U.S. flag and U.S. 
manned vessel operations. These include 
support of the Jones Act and other policies and 
reform proposals, which would make it easier for 
U.S. operators to acquire new vessels and 
operate them under the U.S. flag.
Maritime unions tend to support policies which 
would level out the playing field of international 
shipping and reduce the need or desire for 
American vessel operators to expand their 
foreign flag operations. However, U.S. maritime 
unions have often been criticized for supporting 
protectionist trade policies. In addition, their 
lobbying efforts have raised some concern. The 
Seafarers International Union and International
Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots are 
represented by lobbying groups on Capital Hill- 
the Transportation Institute and the Maritime 
Institute for Research and Industry 
Development, respectively. While these 
“institutes” may appear to be research oriented 
organizations, they are primarily lobbying 
groups. The Transportation Department’s 
Maritime Administration reimburses subsidized 
ship companies for the dues, which are paid to 
these “institutes.” In essence, the lobbying 
efforts of these big groups are being supported by 
taxpayer’s money. Such reimbursement has 
been estimated at approximately $2 million per 
year (Quartel, 1992).
Lobbying Activities of Maritime Unions
Maritime unions also influence legislation by 
making PAC (Political Action Committee) 
contributions to members of Congress who have 
authority over maritime policy. In 1992, for 
example, maritime unions contributed nearly 
$500,000 to members of the Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Committee. In the same year, the 
Seafarers International Union and the National 
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association 
contributed roughly two million dollars to 
members of Congress (Quartel, 1992). Maritime 
labor unions lobbied hard to get the Maritime 
Policy Reform Act of 1992 passed and signed into 
law.
Union leaders laid the foundation for maritime 
reform with their support of HR1126 in 1991. The 
purpose of this legislation was to require foreign 
ships to comply with the National Labor 
Relations Act and Fair Labor Standards Act. The 
unions supported this proposal because they felt 
the extension of U.S. labor laws to foreign flag 
ships operating in the U.S. would benefit their 
interests. The proposal would help by keeping 
foreign flag operators from having the competitive 
advantage, which they gained, by not having to 
adhere to minimum wage levels and working 
conditions. U.S. maritime unions lost this battle 
when the bill was defeated in Congress.
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Erosion of Maritime Unions in the Early 
1990’s
In 1994, the union representing seagoing 
engineers, the Maritime Engineers Benefit 
Association (MEBA), agreed to a new labor 
contract that reduced union compensation in 
exchange for better job security. Under these 
new contracts most MEBA members starting 
receiving reduced benefits, including lower 
overtime pay rates. In 1995, there were several 
events that weakened organized maritime labor.
During 1995 several more U.S. owned ships were 
flagged out, old U.S. flag freighters were retired 
and the movement to repeal the Jones Act gained 
wider support. The unions also had their share of 
serious internal problems. Perhaps the most 
significant was the conviction of five officers of 
District I/MEBA for conspiracy mail fraud, 
extortion, racketeering, and the theft of $6 million 
from union members (Shrock, 1995). This 
conviction gave the FBI and the Department of 
Labor the impetus to intensify investigations of 
maritime union activities and financing 
throughout the U.S.
Other maritime unions were also affected by 
internal problems and external economic 
pressures in 1995-1997. The National Maritime 
Union of America lost some of its member U.S. 
flag bulk carriers because of severe union- 
management conflicts. It is likely that union 
problems in the nineties are a result of the poor 
financial condition of many U.S. flag operators. 
As smaller U.S. flag carriers quit the shipping 
business, union membership further declined. 
Further problems arose when several union 
members under federal investigation filed charges 
against their own union president (Shrock, 1995).
The nagging problem of what to do about low cost 
foreign flag competition was not resolved during 
this period. The differential between U.S. union 
sea-going wages and those paid by competing 
foreign lines remained a major union- 
management issue as the decade came to a close.
SEAGOING WAGES
The issue of U.S. Merchant Marine seagoing 
wages versus European, Asian, and flag-of- 
convenience crews has been hotly debated for 
several years. U.S. labor leaders claim U.S. 
seamen are not paid significantly higher wages 
than foreign seamen. As evidence they cite higher 
rates per ton paid by the Defense Department 
during the Persian Gulf war to move military 
freight on foreign ships versus the same cargo on 
U.S. flag ships (Boggs, 1999).
On the other hand, U.S. ships owmers assert that 
U.S. crew costs are much higher for the same 
class and size ship. They claim U.S. crew costs 
average as much as 2.5 times more than flag-of- 
convenience crew costs making it economically 
infeasible to use U.S. registry without federal 
operating differential subsidies (Whitehurst, 
1996). Two recent pay studies offer new evidence 
to support the agreement raised by U.S. ship 
owners.
Published sources from the U.S. Maritime 
Administration and the International Transport 
Workers Federation reported comparative average 
crew costs associated with operating an 
equivalent size container ship for one month 
(Whitehurst. 1996). These costs in U.S. dollars 
are compared in Table 2.
TABLE 2
COMPARATIVE CREW COST FOR A 
CONTAINERSHIP BY REGISTRY
(U.S. $)
European Asian United States
$80,000 $95,000 $340,000
Source: Whitehurst (1996). Original source
cited in the article was the Maritime 
Administration, “Competitive Manning 
of U.S.-Flag Vessels,” Annual Report of 
the Maritime Administration, 1995.
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A recent breakdown by crew position done by 
Whitehurst also shows U.S. crew costs are 
significantly higher than European, Asian, or flag- 
of-convenience crew costs (1996) (See Table 3).
It should be noted that the International 
Transport Federation (ITF) wage scales apply to 
the highest paid 20 percent of flag-of-convenience 
vessels. Reliable data on the lowest paid foreign 
crews is unavailable, but it is widely believed that 
non-ITF crews are paid significantly less that ITF 
crews. U. S. maritime unions have dealt with the 
pay disparity by lobbying Congress to enact 
protectionist legislation that mandates the use of 
U. S. ships and U.S. seamen. The most recent 
such legislation is the Merchant Marine Act of 
1996.
IMPACT OF THE
MARITIME SECURITY ACT OF 1996
As the need to deploy a very large U.S. military 
force to the Persian Gulf started to grow in early 
1990, maritime labor found a strong ally in the 
Defense Department. When President Bush 
decided to send military forces to the Persian Gulf 
in August of 1990, the U.S. Merchant Marine was 
not capable of supplying enough ships or crewmen 
to get the job done. The administration was 
forced to request merchant shipping support from 
its NATO allies. Fortunately, several allies that
supported the policy of military intervention in 
the Persian Gulf had sufficient sealift capability 
to help and the will to do so. Foreign carriers like 
Maersk of Denmark made their ships available to 
the U.S. Defense Department. By the time the 
deployment (Operation DESERT SHIELD) was 
completed, more than 60% of the merchant sealift 
of U.S. military supplies and equipment to the 
Persian Gulf had been provided by foreign-flag 
ships (Pagonis, 1992). Operation DESERT 
SHIELD highlighted the shortage of U.S. cargo 
ships and U. S. civilian crewmen and greatly 
helped the unions put pressure on Congress to 
provide new operating subsidies to guarantee the 
future availability of U.S.-flag ships. Five years 
after Iraqi forces were removed from Kuwait, 
Congress passed the Maritime Security Act of 
1996.
Eight major unions that fought hard for this new 
subsidy bill were the International 
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, 
International Organization of Masters, Mates 
and Pilots, Maritime Firemen’s Union, Sailors’ 
Union, Sailors’ Union of Pacific, National Marine 
Engineers Beneficial Association, Seafarers 
International Union, and American Maritime 
Officers. Union leaders emphasized the benefits 
of this act on the U.S. economy, employment 
rate, and national defense capabilities.
TABLE 3
MONTHLY SEAGOING WAGES (U.S. $)
Position U.S. Flag European Asian ITF
Master $32,653 $9,697 $4,331 $2,884
2nd Officer 18,727 7,036 1,979 1,491
Radio Officer 15,142 5,475 2,874 1,491
1st Engineer 23,229 8,425 2,796 1,862
2nd Engineer 18,848 7,845 1,979 1,491
Chief Steward 9,053 7,619 2,118 1,491
Able Seaman 6,022 4,510 1,610 856
Source: Whitehurst (1996). Original source cited in the article was the Maritime Administration, 
“Competitive Manning of U.S.-Flag Vessels,” Annual Report of the Maritime Administration, 
1995.
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The new law answers the challenge laid down by 
Sea-land and American President Lines, at least 
for the near-term. It established the Maritime 
Security Program (MSP) with new operating 
subsidies for 47 militarily-useful U.S. flag ships 
over a 10-year period (1996-2005). The owners of 
each ship will receive approximately $2.1 million 
per ship per year. In return the owners pledge to 
maintain U.S. registry and, of course, U.S. crews 
on these designated ships. The Maritime 
Security Act of 1996 provides the ship owners 
and the labor unions with the first significant 
maritime subsidy program since the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1970. This Act is designed to 
protect U.S. merchant marine jobs, improve 
national defense sealift capability and insure a 
U.S. flag presence in international shipping 
through 2005. However, recent U.S. ocean 
shipping regulatory reform and industry 
consolidation may have already diluted the 
beneficial impact unions hoped for.
Recent Ocean Carrier Consolidation
In 1999, Denmark’s A.P. Moller, the parent 
company of Maersk, purchased the international 
division of Sea-Land Services, Inc. This recent 
takeover of the largest U.S.-flag carrier follows 
the 1997 takeover of American President Line 
(APL) by Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) of 
Singapore and the 1997 CP Ships (Canadian) 
takeover of Lykes, the third largest U.S. ocean 
carrier (Beargie, 1999). These mergers have 
placed 31 (3 Lykes ships, 9 APL ships and 19 Sea- 
Land/Maersk ships) of the 47 total MSP vessels 
under foreign control (Damas, 1999).
For the time being these 31 vessels continue to be 
manned by U.S. union seamen. When the MSP 
comes up for renewal in 2005, the issue of foreign 
ownership may force Congress to find other 
alternatives for defense sealift. While it is too 
soon to identify all the likely alternatives, it 
seems clear the protection of U. S. seafaring jobs 
provided by the 1996 Maritime Security Act will 
cease in six years or less. Recent U.S. ocean 
shipping reform also appears to be having a 
detrimental impact on U.S. seafaring labor.
Impact of U.S. Ocean Shipping Regulatory 
Reform
On May 1, 1999, the U.S. Ocean Shipping Reform 
Act (ORSA) became effective. This new law 
significantly reduces regulatory control of ocean 
transportation by the U.S. and encourages 
carriers to become more competitive. A major 
provision of the new law allows carriers to 
negotiate confidential service agreements with 
U.S. shippers and importers. Many foreign 
carriers have already taken steps to reduce their 
operating costs so they can attract new business 
by offering lower rates. The general impact on 
most sectors of the U.S. economy should be 
positive since increased competition usually 
fosters better service and lower transportation 
cost, which in turn can lower the price of 
consumer goods. One sector, which will likely feel 
a negative impact, is organized maritime labor. A 
less regulated carrier industry will likely force 
U.S. ship owners to rely even more heavily on 
lower cost foreign crews resulting in a further 
decline in U.S. seagoing union labor.
CONCLUSION
Maritime unions have had significant influence on 
the United States Merchant Marine. From the 
Seamen’s Act of 1915 to the Maritime Security 
Act of 1996, maritime unions have helped shape 
U.S. maritime policy and have provided high 
paying jobs for their members. Maritime unions 
have also supplied the manpower necessary for 
the sealift of military supplies and equipment in 
times of war and national emergency. Most 
recently, U.S. merchants ships and U.S. merchant 
seamen contributed significantly to the success of 
Operation Desert Storm / Shield. However, there 
is legitimate concern for the vitality of the U.S. 
Merchant Marine in the future.
The recent trend in the global ocean carrier 
industry toward consolidation and rationalization 
will likely continue. As large foreign carriers like 
Maersk and Neptune Orient Lines gain control of 
an increasing number of U.S. registered ships, 
more union jobs will be lost. Ocean shipping has 
become more competitive and shipowners must
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operate as efficiently as possible. When the 
subsidies guaranteed by the Maritime Security 
Act of 1996 expire in 2005, ship owners will find 
it difficult to justify the continued use of U.S. 
union seamen. While Congress and the maritime 
special interests groups debate future political 
options to find another temporary fix, it seems a 
permanent solution may rest on what the unions 
do.
It is clear that owners/operators of U.S. flag ships 
want maritime unions to reduce wage rates, crew
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